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A NEW
JURISPRUDENTIAL
ASPECT OF
ANTISOCIAL
PERSONALITY
DISORDER IN
RELATION TO
MARRIAGEt
REVEREND AUGUSTINE MENDONCA*
The juridical principles concerning an individual's incapacity to con-
tract marriage are now officially embodied in the new Code of Canon
Law.' Canon 1095 of the new Code states:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: those who lack
sufficient use of reason; those who suffer from a grave lack of discretionary
judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be
mutually given and accepted; those who, because of causes of a psychologi-
cal nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.2
t This article comprises a brief commentary on the rotal decision of April 20, 1979, coram
Pinto (S.R.R. 1979). The sentence was published in 104 M.E. 383-95 (1980). A similar
jurisprudential approach to cases involving psychological disorders may be found in two
recent sentences. See c. Pinto (S.R.R. Dec., Dec. 18, 1979), December 18, 1979, in 104 M.E.
375-88 (1980) (Borderline Personality Disorder); id. c. Stankiewicz, (S.R.R. Dec., July 23,
1981), in 107 M.E. 176-85 (1982) (Passive-Aggressive Disorder).
* Psychological Consultant to the Ottawa Regional Matrimonial Tribunal, and Professor,
Faculty of Canon Law, Saint Paul University, Ottawa; B.A., Karnatak University, India,
1970; M.S., University of Ottawa, 1976; M.A., George Washington University, 1977; M.S.,
Saint Paul University, 1979; Ph.D., University of Ottawa, 1982; J.C.D., Saint Paul Univer-
sity, 1983.
CODE OF CANON LAW (Can. Conf. of Cath. Bishops trans. 1983) [hereinafter cited as CODE].
s Id. Canon 1095.
VITIATING CONSENT TO MARRIAGE
In the past, matrimonial tribunals dealt with the grounds determined
at the beginning of the procedure. The actions of the individual were then
examined to determine whether the ground of nullity alleged by the peti-
tioning spouse could sufficiently support, to a moral certainty, a declara-
tion that the marriage was null. Even the psychological condition of the
person(s) was assessed in relation to the predetermined grounds. It is
only in recent years, that the rotal judges, s in particular, have discovered
that a marriage alleged to be invalid on grounds of juridical incapacity to
consent may indeed be null on more than one caput.' It has become clear
to rotal judges that many psychic disorders affect not one, but several
essential elements of matrimonial consent. The rotal decision of April 20,
1979, coram J.M. Pinto is illustrative of this progressive trend.5
This case originated in Mexico and came before the Rota for a hear-
ing in the second instance. Because of the respondent's erratic behavior
both before and after the marriage, the union had lasted less than a year.
On January 20, 1975, the petitioning spouse requested the local matrimo-
nial tribunal declare her marriage a nullity on the basis of "[d]efect of
consent, on the respondent's part, due to his psychic incapacity to fulfill
the essential obligations flowing from the very nature of marriage.", The
respondent, after initially protesting the introduction of the case, failed to
cooperate in the process.
On February 28, 1976, the court of first instance held that there was
enough evidence to declare the marriage null. The Defender of the Bond
insisted on a second hearing and the petitioner requested that this appeal
be heard by the Rota. By a decree of November 8, 1976, the Rota admit-
ted the case for an ordinary examination in the second instance. All ef-
forts to obtain a deposition from the respondent proved futile and, there-
fore, the turnus coram Pinto, having obtained an expert psychiatric
opinion based on the information provided by the petitioner and the wit-
nesses in the first instance, proceeded to examine the case. In an affirma-
tive decision, the Rota stated that the marriage was null on two distinct
grounds: "[diefect of discretion of judgment," and "incapacity to assume
the essential right and obligation of the communio vitae."7
' The Sacred Roman Rota is an appellate tribunal that hears cases appealed to the Holy
See. T. BOUSCAREN, A. ELLIS, & F. KORTH, CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY 169 (4th
ed. 1963). The court is comprised of judges, who are priests appointed by the Pope and who
act as a collegiate tribunal; the judges who hear a particular case are determined by a rota-
tion system. Id. The Rota has jurisdiction to hear matrimonial cases appealed from the
diocesan courts of first instance. Id. at 170, Canon 1444.
A caput is one's civil condition or status. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 192 (5th ed. 1979). In
Roman law, it consisted of the elements of liberty, citizenship, and family. See id.
' See C. Pinto (S.R.R. Dec., April 20, 1979), in 104 M.E. at 383.
' Id. at 383; see CODE, supra note 1, Canon 1095; infra text accompanying notes 10-11.
7 See C. Pinto (S.R.R. Dec., April 20, 1979), in 104 M.E. at 383; CODE, supra note 1, Canon
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The approach adopted by Pinto in his sentence takes into considera-
tion recent developments not only in canonical doctrine and jurispru-
dence, but also in the behavioral sciences. In light of the recent advances
in the psychiatric and psychological sciences, Pinto dismissed the ration-
ale against admitting into canonical jurisprudence the so-called "constitu-
tional immorality," that is, "moral insanity," enunciated by Wynen in his
rotal decision of February 25, 1941.8
Thus, Pinto made a conscious effort to integrate without bias the
progress made in the canonical and behavioral sciences. This approach
may be seen more clearly in the in jure section of the sentence which
contains many juridical principles recently clarified and formulated.9
First, Pinto emphasizes the distinction between the three principal
defects of consent that have been incorporated into the new matrimonial
legislation: incapacity to utilize sufficiently the faculties of reason, inca-
pacity to consent caused by a serious defect in discretionary judgment,
and incapacity to assume the essential obligations to marriage."0 The first
two designations deal with the subjective act: the psychological process
involved in forming and presenting the act of consent. The third, while it
presupposes existence of the capacity to form the act of consent, concerns
itself only with the defect in the object of consent, which the contractant
is unable to give because he cannot fulfill the obligations entailed. This
juridical incapacity may arise from any serious psychic abnormality."
Second, since the marriage under consideration was declared null on
two distinct grounds: "lack of discretion of judgment," and "incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage," the judges had to justify
1095; infra text accompanying notes 10-11.
8 See C. Wynen, in 33 S.R.R. Dec. (1941), at 144-68. Pinto has stated:
The fact of the existence of sociopaths who, affected by neither psychosis nor
neurosis for lack of affectivity, violate the norms of social living without remorse of
conscience and any hope of change is universally acknowledged. They easily commit
crime, but do not necessarily become criminals. Since they are capable of understand-
ing and of willing in a juridical sense and, therefore, have the freedom, their penal
imputability is considered to be perfect in actual civil jurisprudence. The born crimi-
nal described by Lombroso does not exist. Similarly, neither does an organ of moral
sense exist for we are dealing either with spiritual affects (according to the scholas-
tics) or with sensitive affects (according to the moderns). Whether, besides defective
affect, there is also intellectual defect; whether the abnormal behaviour should be
explained as the result of psychogenic and sociogenic causes rather than of personal-
ity disorder; whether, at least sometimes, sociopaths could be cured, are disputed
questions . . . . The ecclesiastical judge, therefore, may depend on certain tested
principles.
C. Pinto (S.R.R. Dec., April 20, 1979), in 104 M.E. at 383-95.
1 See C. Pinto (S.R.R. Dec., April 20, 1979), in 104 M.E. at 384-90; CODE, supra note 1,
Canon 1095.
"0 CODE, supra note 1, Canon 1095.
" See C. Pinto (S.R.R. Dec., April 20, 1979), in 104 M.E. at 394.
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their decision that these two juridical incapacities could coexist in a per-
son with a serious psychic anomaly. Pinto admitted that the autonomy of
the caput of "incapacity to assume the essential obligations" is still being
disputed both in doctrine and in jurisprudence. Nevertheless, he made it
clear that the two juridical principles could be said to coexist, if the expe-
rience of cases involving this caput were taken into consideration.12
In other words, Pinto argued that in cases of this nature the two
grounds of nullity (that is, defect of discretion of judgment and incapac-
ity to assume the essential obligations of marriage), are distinct and can
coexist, and the marriage would be null on both grounds. In certain other
types of cases, however, this principle may not be applicable.
Only the incapacity to assume the obligations occurs when the con-
tractant is unaware of his incapacity, in the sense that it had never ap-
peared before (e.g., psychic impotence became manifest when the couple de-
cided to consummate the marriage), or when, after sufficient experience, he
thought that he had been cured of his incapacity, or still if he had learned
from an expert that marriage might cure the incapacity which he thinks he
has. An example of the second hypothesis is found in the case of a bisexual
who, from his daily experiences, thought that he had become heterosexual
and contracted marriage. After the marriage, because of a psychic trauma
he suffered, he became an exclusive homosexual, absolutely incapable of
heterosexual relationship."3
In corar Parisella,1 4 the contractant was found to be radically inca-
pable of fulfilling the obligation of perpetuity of the right to "conjugal
acts" and to "communio vitae." At the time of the wedding, however, as a
result of positive and reassuring experiences, he thought it would be pos-
sible for him to enter into a heterosexual relationship. The faculties of his
mind were intact. He could form and give consent. His act of consent,
therefore, could not be regarded as having been vitiated in the strict
sense. Nevertheless, the consent was invalid because of the defect in the
object that he intended to exchange.
Pinto's analysis, while progressive, fails to deal with persons who, be-
cause of some serious personality disorder, are not only unaware of their
" Id. at 384-85.
The incapacity to give consent coexists with the incapacity to assume the obliga-
tions when the person marrying, being aware of his incapacity, decides to go ahead
with the wedding, thus acting irrationally. This has been verified in the case of a
neurasthenic psychopath who, fully conscious of the fact that he was suffering from
psychic impotence, contracted marriage led by pathological motivation, whence there
was lack of consent. The caput of impotence cannot be denied.
Id.; cf. C. Lefevure (S.R.R. Dec., December 2, 1967), in 59 M.E. 799 (1967).
13 C. Pinto (S.R.R. Dec., April 20, 1979), in 104 M.E. at 385 (emphasis in original); cf C.
Parisella (S.R.R. Dec., May 11, 1978), in 89 II I.D.E. 3-17 (1978).
C. Parisella (S.R.R. Dec., May 11, 1978), in 89 II I.D.E. at 3-17.
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incapacity to consent but, because of severe lack of insight and self-
knowledge, are also incapable of knowing their defect. This is especially
true in the case of "antisocial personality disorder."1
Third, Pinto explained that the incapacity to give consent may be
verified:
1) In the phase of consideration of marriage or of the motives for it:
a) Because the intellect cannot have adequate understanding of the es-
sential rights and obligations of marriage;
b) Because of the disturbance of memory or of fantasy which may hin-
der one from being able to assess the motives for contracting or not
contracting;
c) Where the motives have been pathological (e.g., delusional, predomi-
nant, obsessive, dissociative ideas);
2) In the phase of deliberation or election;
a) In case of disturbance of conscience, especially on account of hypno-
sis or twilight state;
b) Due to defect in the critical [faculty] which impedes adequate esti-
mation of the motives, that is, from adequate deliberation;
c) When, due to disturbed affectivity, motives lack in quality and in
intensity an adequate affective base, and the will remains, therefore,
indecisive;
d) Where an impulsive choice is made without prior or, at least, ade-
quate deliberation;
e) Due to loss of will-power. '
Fourth, the justification of the declaration of the nullity on the basis
of "incapacity to assume the essential right and obligation of communio
vitae depended on the judges' acceptance of the juridical relevance of the
Conciliar teaching on marriage as expressed in the Pastoral Constitution
on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes. Pinto summa-
rized the opinion of the court as follows:
The Second Vatican Council, intending to restore to the institution of
marriage its authentic value, decided to combine the existential-personalis-
tic aspects of the 'good of the spouses,' which has been so highly esteemed
in our time, with the traditional juridico-social aspect of the 'good of the
child.' Therefore, it gave the following existential definition of marriage: 'In-
'6 An antisocial personality disorder is defined as:
[a] disorder characterized by the inability to get along with other members of society
and by repeated conflicts with individual persons and groups. Common attributes in-
clude impulsiveness, egocentricity, hedonism, low frustration tolerance, irresponsibil-
ity, inadequate conscience development, exploitation of others, and rejection of au-
thority and discipline.
H. KAPLAN, A. FREEDMAN, & B. SADOCK, 3 COMPREHENsIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 3310
(1980).
1' C. Pinto (S.R.R. Dec., April 20, 1979), in 104 M.E. at 386.
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timate community of life and conjugal love'; it defined matrimonial consent,
that is, marriage in fieri, as a human act by which spouses give themselves
to each other and accept each other; it speaks of marriage in facto esse as:
'Thus man and woman, who through their conjugal covenant, 'are no longer
two but one flesh'.., by the intimate union of their very persons and tasks,
offer to each other mutual help and service, experience and attain the full-
ness of that unity from day to day.'1
The concept of the "right to communio vitae""' is important to
Pinto's analysis. Pinto conceded that, in accordance with the spirit of the
Second Vatican Council, the study group concerned with matrimonial leg-
islation added the "right to communio vitae" to the obligations that had
been traditionally acknowledged as essential. This right is distinct from
cohabitation. Referring to the statement made by the consultors at their
meeting of May 20, 1977, Pinto stated that the right to "communion of
life" encompasses those "rights which pertain to essential interpersonal
relations of the spouses and which, in today's context, are considered as a
complex of rights distinct from other rights which were commonly enu-
merated in the traditional doctrine.""' Therefore, the right to "communio
vitae" described by the Council can exist even without cohabitation, but
is limited to its essential elements without which the conjugal partnership
could not exist or, at least, would be morally impossible. Pinto did not
attempt to detail these essential elements. He did, however, draw two im-
portant juridical principles from the substance of canons 1048 and 1049
of the 1980 Schema, canon 1095 of the new Code, relevant to the caput of
incapacity to assume marital obligations:
i) It is sufficient that the psychic disorder causing the juridical incapac-
ity to assume the essential obligations be true and antecedent to the act of
consent. In other words, the disorder itself does not have to be incurable.
ii) The norms contained in those two canons may be legitimately ap-
plied even before they are promulgated because they are derived from the
general principles of natural law and pertain to the very essence of
7 Id. at 386 (quoting Gaudium et Spes (The Church in the Modern World) part II, ch. 1,
para. 48).
18 Gaudium et Spes, supra note 17. The community of life is the essence of the marriage
covenant. Haring, Fostering the Nobility of Marriage and the Family, in 5 COMMENTARY ON
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 232 (H. Vorgrimler ed. 1969). "The contractual agreement is
understood now not just as a cerebral, verbally communicated intention, but as a disposition
that involves the spiritual, the psychological, and the physical. It is a much broader consent,
complimenting a growth in understanding ...." Perry, The Canonical Concept of Marital
Consent: Roman Law Influences, 25 CATH. LAW. 228, 235 (1980); see also 9 NEw CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA 265-66 (D. Eggenberger ed. 1967) (formal object of consensual agreement ex-
tended to "right of a life partnership").
'9 C. Pinto (S.R.R. Dec., April 20, 1979), in 104 M.E. at 387; 19-N.1 COMMUNICATIONES 375
(1977).
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marriage.20
Fifth, Pinto clearly identified the respondent's psychic disorder as
"antisocial personality" as understood in North American Psychiatry, or
"affectionless psychopath" as in K. Schneider's classification. It is uncom-
mon for a rotal sentence to contain such a clear identification of a com-
mon diagnostic concept underlying two different psychiatric labels used
by two different systems of diagnostic classification.2'
Drawing from a clinical description provided by H. Cleckley in his
article in the American Handbook of Psychiatry,2 Pinto identified eight
principal clusters of antisocial traits. 3 Interestingly, this description cor-
responds to the profile of the "affectionless-psychopath" given by K.
Schneider as well as the profile of an "antisocial personality" provided in
DSM 111.24
Pinto offered the following practical and jurisprudentially important
guidelines as an aid to assessing cases involving personality disorders in
general:
i) In such cases, the perceptual and representational processes within
the brain are partially defective, thereby affecting the subject's capacity to
make a deliberate and free choice.
ii) The thought process of such a person is markedly stunted and dis-
plays a tendency toward simplification, poor inhibitory control and impul-
'0 C. Pinto (S.R.R. Dec., April 20, 1979), in 104 M.E. at 387.
* Id. at 389. Pinto states:
In reference to our case, the principal diagnostic criteria should be kept in mind.
The best clinical description is given by H.M. Cleckley .... which, in the European
system corresponds to the 'affectionless' type, and in the American system is called
'antisocial' 
....
Id.
'2 Cleckley, Psychopathic States, in 1 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 581-83 (S. Arieti
ed. 1959).
23 C. Pinto (S.R.R. Dec., April 20, 1979), in 104 M.E. at 384-90. The clusters of antisocial
traits may be summarized as follows: Good intelligence and absence of any thought-disorder
at the theoretical level; habitual and inadequately motivated and, at times, even self-de-
structive antisocial behavior; gross irresponsibility in serious matters despite any apparent
positive impression he may succeed in creating in others' minds; incapacity to maintain the
trust and security he may have gained through good behavior for a short time; utter lack of
concern for truth; readiness to accept blame for his behavior, if caught in the act, and to
promise reparation and amendment, but an inability to make good his promises; inability to
accept responsibility for hurting others; lack of genuine feelings of remorse or shame; inca-
pacity for critical judgment when he has actively to participate in real life situations; failure
to learn from experience; pathologic egocentricity and incapacity for genuine, oblative love;
incapacity to establish stable and intimate personal relationships; lack of insight which seri-
ously affects his capacity to reflect upon his own behavior and to recognize the pain and
sufferings he causes to others.
" THE COMMITTEE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DSM III: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 317-21 (3d ed. 1980).
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sivity in making decisions without taking into consideration the available
alternatives or countermotives.
iii) It is impossible to give a general rule because the degree and the
quality of the disorder vary from case to case. The judge should carefully
examine the report of the expert and establish clearly the degree, quality
and effects of the disorder as manifested in the psychopathic behavior. 26
After having carefully weighed the antecedent, concomitant, and sub-
sequent circumstances relevant to the marriage, the judge should answer
the following questions:
Was the contractant capable of understanding the substance of mar-
riage, that is its essential obligations and their ethical value (affecting his
conscience and not merely his theoretical knowledge)?
Was he able to consider at least the main, commonly foreseeable diffi-
culties that could arise in a marital relationship?
Could he adequately assess and compare the objective motives in favor
of the wedding here and now (practical judgment) and freely choose the
celebration of marriage?
And, finally, was he, at the time of the celebration, capable of fulfilling
the essential obligations of marriage?"8
In the in facto section of the sentence Pinto analyzed the respon-
dent's behavior according to the clinical criteria of antisocial personality.
A brief summary of the respondent's antisocial traits can be presented as
follows: the respondent had proved himself antisocial by his frequent vio-
lations of norms of morality both before and after the marriage. He had
lied, embezzled, cheated, deceived and incurred, without real necessity,
large debts. Through his irresponsible living, both before and after the
marriage, he appeared unconcerned with fulfilling the essential obliga-
2 C. Pinto (S.R.R. Dec., April 20, 1979), in 104 M.E. at 388-89.
26 Id. at 388. After making an accurate assessment of the acts of the case, the peritus diag-
nosed in the respondent:
A psychopathic personality [personality disorder] which is dominated by the ele-
ments of emotional and affective instability, of inconsistency in the determination of
the will, of a tendency to lie and to be untruthful, of incapacity to assume a definite
role in relation to the decisions which are said to have been made .... Therefore,
morbid manifestations prevail in the realm of affect, will and moral structure. All the
same, he can be placed among the following types (according to Schneider): the 'emo-
tionally labile', the 'unstable', the 'weak-willed', the 'hystrionic', the 'mythomaniac',
the 'liar', the 'amoral'. Such conditions of lack of character and of personality are
largely constitutional and they certainly predate the marriage.
It is evident that the defect of his personality, his grossly superficial judgments
concerning the common events of life, his dishonesty in different situations and the
abuse of trust which was given to him repeatedly have rendered the respondent psy-
chologically incapable of making an adequate evaluation of the obligations which he
was undertaking when he expressed his consent.
Id. at 393.
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tions of marriage. Associated with his irresponsibility was pathological in-
stability. He frequently changed his course of studies, his career, his jobs,
and his cars, and was extremely volatile in making and abiding by his
decisions. His religious practice was likewise inconsistent. Although there
were many verbal expressions of love toward the petitioner, they were
never matched by acts. He contributed little to the physical, psychologi-
cal, and spiritual well-being of the petitioner and showed little concern
about the possibility of having and bringing up children. Rather, his life-
style was characterized by extreme egocentricity.
The expert's opinion seemed to emphasize the respondent's psychic
defect primarily in the area of critical evaluation of the marital obliga-
tions. As a clinician, however, he also could have addressed more specifi-
cally the objective aspect of the consent. Assumption of the obligations
presupposes that the contractant possesses the necessary natural psychic
capacity required to fulfill the obligations. In the absence of such psychic
capacity, the obligations cannot be fulfilled and, therefore, cannot be as-
sumed. It is not surprising that the rotal judges came to a twofold
conclusion:
(1) The respondent was incapable of giving matrimonial consent since,
because of the severity of the disorder, he was unable either to understand
the ethical value of the essential obligations of marriage in a manner affect-
ing his conscience, or to estimate sufficiently the difficulties either present
or future, generally foreseeable at the time, so that he could deliberate ade-
quately and choose rationally the celebration of marriage.2"
Thus, the disorder of "antisocial personality" severely impaired the
respondent's psychological process involved in the act of consent in the
phase of understanding, deliberation, and choice. The judges acknowl-
edged that the respondent was not insane, but, on the contrary, being
endowed with good intelligence, he was able to understand the substance
of the marital obligations. Nevertheless, this capacity to understand did
not go beyond the theoretical plane. His "constitutional immorality" -
the inner disposition that later evolved in environmental conditions con-
ducive to form a fixed behavior-pattern - caused him to act as if he had
no conscience. According to Schneider, "affectionless psychopaths" are
"remorseless" and "conscienceless."
In sum, respondent suffered from an "antisocial personality disor-
der," cared little about weighing the difficulties involved in a particular
situation and rushed into action without any reflection or forethought. He
lacked the capacity for deliberation proportionate to the nature of his
decisions. The respondent lacked discretion of judgment proportionate to
the obligations he was assuming by the act of his matrimonial consent.
27 Id.
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Moreover, the respondent was, at the time of the wedding, incapable of
binding himself to hand over the essential right to the communion of life.
This is not, as it may seem, in respect to the intimate union of persons
(which is known as interpersonal integration, and is entirely necessary),
but as this concerns the union of tasks without which conjugal life could
not exist. Consequently it was impossible to achieve the good -of the
spouses in its essence, thereby also impeding the perpetuity of the good of
the children. However, this was not because the respondent did not want
to fulfill [the essential obligations of marriage] but because he was unable
to do so. 8
Pinto referred, in his conclusion, to one distinct, essential element:
the union of tasks. The respondent, through the antisocial behavior,
proved incapable of cooperating in the tasks (opera) essential to the reali-
zation of conjugal and parental duties. As a result, the "good of the
spouses" in its essence, the physical, psychological, and spiritual well-be-
ing that should naturally ensue from a genuine conjugal relationship,
could not be achieved. He was also incapable of caring for the good of the
children. In the absence of the capacity to cooperate in the essential con-
jugal and parental tasks, the "right tocommunion of life," was denied to
his spouse. Therefore, his consent was invalid for the lack of the object of
consent. In other words, the respondent was incapable of fulfilling an es-
sential obligation relative to the realization of the "communion of life" of
the spouses.
Further clinical and juridical analysis of the case may enable identifi-
cation of the respondent's psychic incapacity to fulfill and, therefore, to
assume several essential obligations of marriage. For example, Pinto, sup-
ported by authoritative psychiatric and psychological sources, indicated
that a person with a serious antisocial personality disorder is radically
impaired in many areas of psychic life and, therefore, lacks intrapsychic
integration. This intrapsychic disturbance generally renders the affected
person incapable of establishing an authentic interpersonal relationship.
Therefore, this marriage could have been examined under the test of "in-
capacity to assume the essential right and obligation of interpersonal re-
lationship." Alternatively, the case may have been examined under the
juridical designation of "incapacity to assume the right and obligation of
bonum prolis."2 9 In view of the nature and extent of the effects of "anti-
social personality disorder" on the various components of one's psychic
life, many more juridical titles could be added to the list. Even though
such an approach may enhance jurisprudential acumen, in a particular
28 Id. at 394.
29 Haring, supra note 18, at 234. The bond of marriage, however, is grounded in the commu-
nity of love and not solely on the bonum prolis, the blessing of children, as put forth by
many old natural law treatises. Id.
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case, it is important and sufficient that a fair decision be rendered on the
existence or nonexistence of the matrimonial bond on trial.
The fact that the court declared this marriage null on two grounds
demonstrates that if judges approach cases of this kind with an open
mind and in a scholarly manner, the nature of the particular pyschic dis-
order and its relation to matrimonial consent may be seen and assessed in
clearer perspective.
